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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper provides empirical evidence on the existence of implicit taxes in the corporate 
sector. With this finding, it provides support for the offsetting nature of explicit versus 
implicit taxes. Governments continuously provide tax preferences (tax incentives) to firms to 
induce these firms to alter their investment, production and financing decisions to reallocate 
resources towards outcomes that the government prefers. Tax preferences lead to lower 
explicit tax rates for firms that make use of these preferences. However (see Scholes and 
Wolfson (1992) and Wilkie (1992)), economic theory suggests that in equilibrium all firms 
must earn the same after-tax return (e.g. ROE). Hence high (low) implicit taxes (tax 
preference induced adjustments of pre-tax returns) can be expected for firms with low (high) 
explicit taxes. This paper uses financial statements of 123 listed firms for six years (1991-
1996) to provide empirical evidence on the existence of implicit taxes in the corporate sector 
in the Netherlands. The paper finds that the inverse relation between implicit and explicit 
taxes exists, but is not a strong as expected, suggesting market frictions that prevent the 
equalisation of after-tax returns. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Tax legislators (governments) continuously provide tax preferences (tax incentives or tax 
subsidies) to firms to induce these firms to alter their operating, investment or financing decisions 
to reallocate resources towards outcomes that the governments prefer as part of their economic 
policy. 
Providing tax preferences to targeted firms creates the problem of tax equitability, i.e. 
whether firms are treated equally tax wise. Previous tax accounting research studied tax 
equitability by focusing on the Effective Tax Rate (ETR) measure. ETRs are often defined as tax 
charge divided by pre-tax accounting income. Thus, ETRs measure the amount of taxes payable 
by the company, the explicit taxes. However, this research has tended to overlook the fact that 
differences in explicit tax rates will, due to market competition, lead to implicit taxes, which are 
the differences between pre-tax returns on fully taxed investments and the pre-tax returns on 
partially or tax-exempt investments (Scholes and Wolfson, 1992, Wilkie, 1992). In fact, lower 
explicit taxes will thus lead to higher implicit taxes and vice versa. Therefore, equitable taxation 
would focus on equal total taxes across companies, including explicit and implicit taxes. Most 
research to date has focused on examining effective tax rates, while only a relatively small 
number of studies have investigated implicit taxes. The present paper will focus on explicit, 
implicit as well as total taxes. In doing so, this is the first study to use Dutch data and the first 
study investigating corporate implicit taxes in a cross-sectional design using a paired-sample 
design. By using this design, this paper avoids to a certain extent the pitfalls of controlling for 
risk and market friction. 
Economic theory (see again, Scholes and Wolfson, 1992, Wilkie, 1992) suggests that in a 
competitive market the inverse association between explicit and implicit taxes should have a 
value of one. Put differently, in a competitive market the total tax burden, explicit and implicit, 
should equalise. Otherwise, arbitrage possibilities will be present. In the context of firms 
therefore, total taxes, explicit plus implicit taxes, should be equal across companies in a 
competitive market.  
Note that, if total taxes are equal across companies, using (positive or negative) tax 
subsidies has no economic effect on companies, since tax preferences are replaced by implicit 
taxes (and vice versa for negative tax subsidies).  
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In section two of this paper previous research will be addressed along with the 
conceptual model development. Section three operationalises the model and specifies the 
variables to be used, whereas section four will address the empirical methodology used in this 
paper. The results will be presented in section five. Finally, section six will provide a conclusion.  
 
Note that below, like we did above, we will use the terms tax preference and tax subsidy 
interchangeably. 
 
2. PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
 
Previous empirical tax accounting research has assessed the importance of implicit taxes 
only to a limited degree. The theoretical framework was developed by Scholes and Wolfson 
(1992). Empirical studies that use it either investigate specific or corporate settings. Research on 
specific settings is in Stickney, Weil and Wolfson (1983), Scholes, Wilson and Wolfson (1990), 
Shackelford (1991) and Guenther (1994). Research in corporate settings is in Wilkie (1992), 
Callihan and White (1999) and Gupta and Weaver (1998). Corporate setting research was 
initiated by Wilkie (1992). 
When discussing implicit taxes, the most important notion is the tax preference concept. 
Tax preferences are cross-sectional and intertemporal differences in the firms' exclusions, 
deductions, and other items that cause taxable income to diverge from pre-tax economic income 
(Wilkie, 1988). Due to the existence of positive or negative tax preferences, implicit taxes arise, 
since the marketplace will bid up the prices of tax-favoured investments, and thereby lower the 
pre-tax investments' returns (Scholes and Wolfson, 1992). Thus, implicit taxes are not paid 
(directly) to the tax authorities, but by the beneficiaries of these tax preferences. Implicit taxes on 
investments are defined as the difference between the before-tax return on a fully taxable 
investment and the before-tax return on a not-fully taxed investment (Scholes and Wolfson, 
1992). Since investors will demand higher returns for riskier investments, these returns are risk-
adjusted.  
An investor will thus not only pay explicit taxes, but also implicit taxes. In a competitive 
market, there should be a perfectly negative association between explicit and implicit taxes. The 
total taxes for an investment, that is explicit taxes plus implicit taxes, should be equal across 
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investments (when controlling for non-tax costs); otherwise tax arbitrage possibilities will exist 
(Scholes and Wolfson, 1992). The framework of Scholes and Wolfson will be used later on to 
develop the model used in this paper.  
In the first major paper to test this theoretical framework in a corporate setting Wilkie 
(1992) has empirically tested the implicit tax hypothesis by investigating the relationship between 
pre-tax return on equity and the pre-tax equivalent of tax-subsidies on equity. He finds a 
consistent and statistically significant inverse relation between pre-tax return and tax subsidy. 
However, the actual relationship found was weaker than hypothesised by the implicit tax 
hypothesis for a competitive market. But, Wilkie (1992) did not control for non competitive costs 
in his study. This omission might affect the strength of the relationship reported by Wilkie.  
A number of other studies have also, to some extent, studied implicit taxes in a corporate 
setting. In an earlier study, Wilkie (1988) found that "ETR variations are caused by differences in 
both tax preferences and income whenever tax preferences and income are not perfectly 
correlated" (Wilkie, 1988), thereby providing support for the implicit tax hypothesis.  
Studies focusing on specific settings include Stickney, Weil and Wolfson (1983) who, in a 
study of General Electric, found evidence supporting the implicit tax hypothesis regarding tax-
transfer leases. 
In another specific setting study, Scholes, Wilson and Wolfson (1990) found evidence of 
both implicit taxes and of non-tax costs in their study of changes in bank holdings of municipal 
bonds in response to tax rule changes regarding interest expense deductibility.  
Using a different specific setting, Shackelford (1991), with regard to leveraged Employee 
Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs), reported a similar finding. According to Shackelford most (but 
not all) of the tax benefits are shifted to the borrowers, thus providing support for both the 
implicit tax hypothesis as well as non-tax costs. 
Combining an event study and the theoretical implicit tax concept, Guenther (1994) found 
evidence that changes in tax rates were linked with changes in pre-tax returns, regarding Treasury 
bills yields.  
Recent research in the corporate setting is in Callihan and White (1999). Not only is the 
existence of implicit taxes researched, Callihan and White also use the firm's market power as a 
proxy for market inefficiencies. They find support for the existence of implicit taxes as well as for 
market structure differences relating to implicit taxes. 
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Another recent study in a corporate setting is by Gupta and Weaver (1998), who 
investigate the existence of implicit taxes in the corporate sector, while taking into account time 
effects, specific tax legislation, industry membership and firm size. Their results also provide 
support for the existence of implicit taxes, though these do not appear to fully offset the explicit 
taxes.  
Summarising the existing implicit tax accounting literature, previous studies have found 
evidence relating to the implicit tax hypothesis, although the associations found are not perfectly 
inverse as hypothesised, often due to the fact that the studies do not fully control for variation in 
risk and market frictions. . 
The present study will focus not only on the association between explicit and implicit 
taxes, but will also investigate the level of total taxes across companies, while addressing two 
aspects which sofar have not been fully incorporated, risk and market frictions.  
 
3. CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
 
3.1 ORIGINAL SPECIFICATION 
 
Scholes and Wolfson (1992) discuss the relationship between before- and after-tax returns 
on investment as follows. Let: 
Rb be the return on fully taxed investments (the benchmark return); 
Ra be the return on tax-exempt or partially taxed investments (the alternative return); 
tIa be the implicit tax rate on the alternative investment; 
then Scholes and Wolfson state: 
 
(1)  Rb (1-tIa) = Ra    
 
Or, benchmark return minus implicit taxes is alternative return, for two different 
investments. Two assumptions underlying this model are the presence of competitive markets and 
the usage of risk-adjusted returns. Furthermore, this model also requires that one of the retunrs 
can be identified as the benchmark return (the fully taxed return). Let: 
Ia be the implicit taxes; 
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where tIa = Ia/Rb; then equation (1) can be rewritten as: 
 
(2)  Rb - Ra = Ia 
 
for two investments. The implicit taxes, Ia, are the price investors have to pay for preferential 
(explicit) tax treatment. Tax preferences are the differences between taxable income and financial 
accounting income before taxes for a specific investment. Collectively, tax preferences are 
denoted tax subsidy. Furthermore, for one investment, there exists one return. 
Since a company is the aggregate of a number of investments, the model can be extended 
to capture company differences. Let: 
Rc be the company-specific return; 
tIc  be the implicit tax rate of the company 
Ic be the implicit taxes of the company 
then (2) can be rewritten as  
 
(3) Rc =  - tIc + Rb 
 
for a specific company with risk-adjusted returns in a competitive market . Or: 
 
(4) Rc =  Rb -   Ic 
 
Indicating that the (alternative) company return is equal to the benchmark return minus the 
implicit taxes. Now we introduce risk for both returns. Company risk will not directly affect 
implicit taxes, since implicit taxes arise out of tax preferences and are not due to company returns 
(Wilkie, 1988) as expressed in (5). Let: 
RF be the risk factor 
(5) (1 + RFc) Rc = Rb(1 + RFb) – Ic(1 + RFi) 
 
Now we also introduce market frictions, let: 
FRc be the combined market frictions  
(6) (1 + RFc) Rc + FRc = Rb(1 + RFb) – Ic(1 + RFi) 
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for two companies, with one benchmark return. In a cross-sectional setting we do not have a 
benchmark return, only cross-sectional returns. Replacing the benchmark return with another 
cross-sectional return, let: 
Rd be the return of company d 
 
(7) (1 + RFc) Rc + FRc = Rd(1 + RFd) – Ic(1 + RFi) 
 
which expresses the relationship of two cross-sectional returns considering risk and market 
frictions.  
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3.2 DUTCH CORPORATE INCOME TAX 
 
The Dutch financial accounting system follows the Anglo-Saxon model were there is a 
certain degree of independence between the determination of taxable income and financial 
accounting income. Therefore tax preferences can be deduced from financial statements. 
Dutch tax preferences include: differences with regard to valuation of provisions, 
additional depreciation allowances, the existence of participation exemption, treatment of fiscal 
reserves and exchange rate differences. According to a study of the Dutch tax authorities 
(Belastingdienst, 1997), the participation exemption is the single most important tax preference in 
the Netherlands, being 53.1% of the total tax preferences in 1992 for the investigated sample. The 
existence of the participation exemption is caused by the Dutch corporate income tax system 
being a territorial tax system. Whereas a worldwide tax system (used by, among others, the USA) 
basically taxes worldwide income of a company, the territorial tax system only taxes profits 
accruing to the home country, exempting foreign country profits from home country taxation. 
Under the Dutch participation exemption, profits arising from participations in which the investor 
has an ownership of at least five percent, are untaxed. For holdings with foreign subsidiaries this 
effectively means that the foreign tax rate is the final tax rate for foreign profits, in contrast to the 
world-wide tax system where the home country tax rate is basically the final tax rate for all 
profits.  
The current Dutch corporate income tax rate is 35 percent. In previous years, the first 
fl100,000.- or fl 250,000.- of taxable profits was taxed at various rates between 35 and 40 percent. 
However a statutory tax rate of 35 percent is assumed below.  
 
3.3 EXTENDED SPECIFICATION 
 
The first assumption underlying the theoretical framework is the usage of risk adjusted 
returns (Scholes and Wolfson, 1992).  
The specific level of company risk will affect both the before- and after-tax rates of 
return, since investors will demand a higher return for more risky ventures and companies will 
increase their cost of capital with a risk surcharge. From (7) we have the following model: 
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(7) (1 + RFc) Rc + FRc = Rd(1 + RFd) – Ic(1 + RFi) 
 
To estimate this model, the following information is required: 
• the before tax returns of companies (Rc and Rd); 
• the risk level of companies (RFc and RFd); 
• the amount of market frictions (FRc ). 
Previous cross-sectional research (Wilkie (1992) , Callihan and White (1999) and Gupta and 
Weaver (1998)) has shown that it is difficult to directly control for risk and market frictions. In 
this paper we therefore use a design such that we do not have to control for differing risk levels 
and market frictions.  
Firstly, if risk levels are the same for both firms, (7) simplifies to  
 
(8) Rc + FRc = Rd – Ic 
 
That is: a company’s return (Rc) plus the cost of market frictions (FRc) is equal to another 
company’s return (Rd) minus the implicit taxes. Implicit taxes in this setting can either be 
negative, positive or zero as neither of the returns is a benchmark return.  
Secondly, if the company’s are traded in a competitive market, no market frictions will be present 
and (8) can be simplified to (9): 
 
(9) Rc = Rd – Ic 
 
That is, the before-tax return of a firm is equal to the before-tax return of another firm minus 
implicit taxes. The next section will detail how we try to eliminate risk differences and market 
frictions. 
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4. DATA, SAMPLE SELECTION, MODELS AND TESTS 
 
4.1 RISK 
 
In order to be able to use model (9) where there are no risk differences between individual 
company returns, we first have to define the returns. As implicit taxes relate to earnings accruing 
to the owners of the company (being the shareholders), for the moment we define the returns of 
the company as the stock market returns. The risk of stock market returns can be measured by 
using beta, which reflects the risk of the company to the shareholders which are also the relevant 
title-holders to the company’s profit. Furthermore, a company’s beta reflects the risk of the 
combined investments or operations of the company. Now, by pairing firms with identical betas 
we can eliminate risk differences between companies.  
 
4.2 MARKET FRICTIONS 
 
Market frictions or deadweight costs are those frictions that prevent the market from functioning 
in a competitive manner. These frictions for instance include transaction costs. Although it is 
difficult to fully eliminate market frictions in the research design, we can eliminate transaction 
costs to some extent by only using companies in the research sample being traded on the same 
stock market (bearing, if any, the same relative market frictions) and in an active market segment 
(ensuring the lowest market frictions available in the stock market).  
 
4.3 METHODOLOGY 
 
To be able to measure the trade-off between explicit and implicit taxes without having to control 
directly for risk differences and market frictions, a paired sample design is used where each 
company is paired to another company with the same degree of risk (as captured by beta) and the 
lowest possible amount of market frictions (companies being traded in the most active segment of 
the Dutch stock market). In this paired sample design, the explicit tax rates should be negatively 
correlated with implicit taxes (tax preference induced adjustments of pre-tax returns). In an 
optimal setting with risk adjusted returns and absent market frictions this negative correlation 
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should have a value of 1, or, relative total taxes (explicit plus implicit taxes) across the paired 
observations should be the same. 
In a situation where both firms have some implicit taxes, the relationship is: 
 
(10) ETRa + ITRb = ETRb + ITRb 
where: 
ETRa,b = effective (explicit) tax rate of firm a,b respectively 
ITRa,b = implicit tax rate of firm a,b respectively 
Let: 
TTRa,b = total tax rate of firm a,b respectively 
then: 
(11) TTRa = TTRb 
or: 
(12) TTRa – TTRb = 0 
 
As it is unlikely that our research design fully eliminates risk differences and/or market frictions, 
we do not expect (12) to be true in the empirical setting. We therefore focus on the goodness of 
fit of the model for which we use model (10). Now we let the firm with the highest ETR be the 
benchmark return (in this case firm A), (10) simplifies to (13): 
 
(13) ETRa  = ETRb + ITRb 
 
As the implicit tax rate for firm B is the difference between pre-tax returns of firms A and B, 
expressing (13) in pre-tax returns comes down to: 
 
(14) ETRa  = ETRb + ([pretax return A – pretax return B]*[1-ETRa])/pretax return B 
  
where the last term equals ITRb. 
 
4.4 ESTIMATION PROCEDURE 
To test (14) we use OLS regression estimates using the following regression equation: 
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yi = ß1iETRb + ß2iITRb + εi 
 
 
where: 
yi = effective tax rate of firm a (the firm with the highest ETR in the pair) for observation i 
εi = the error term 
 
Note that as a result of (14) the regression equation should pass through the origin as a result 
of which no alfa is included in the regression equation. 
 
4.4 VARIABLE DEFINITION 
 
ETR = 
pre=tax return =  
beta =  
beta spread ? (20%) 
 
4.5 DATASOURCE 
 
Data were obtained from the Worldscope database, which comprises information on over 17,000 
companies worldwide. Data for the years 1991-1996 were collected for Dutch firms available on 
Worldscope. Worldscope only includes the largest Dutch firms (see below), whose information is 
transferred to a standard format enabling comparisons between companies. Due to data 
limitations, not all information in the standard format is filled out for Dutch companies. Thus, not 
all necessary data was available on Worldscope.  In order to obtain those missing data, the Dutch 
CD-ROM datafile REACH was used, as well as annual reports of those companies. This 
additional data retrieving ensured that only a small number of companies had to be deleted from 
the final sample, due to missing data. 
 
4.6 SAMPLE SELECTION 
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Only listed companies were included in the sample. Data for six years, 1991-1996 were 
used. From the original sample were excluded three categories of companies. Firstly, banks and 
insurance companies were deleted since these are subject to different accounting and tax rules. 
Secondly, only active companies were included, thereby excluding discontinued companies. 
Lastly, only companies with an industry template were included, thus effectively excluding 
investment companies and other financial institutions. A small number of companies had 
insufficient data, either because these were newly introduced companies, without having 
extended historical information, or they did not report (all of) the required data. The sample 
selection is reproduced in table 1. 
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Table 1: Sample selection. 
Dutch companies available on Worldscope    228 
Less: banks and insurance companies (SIC codes: 60,61,63,64) 27 
Less: Inactive companies (i.e. discontinued or merged)  37 
Less: companies with a non-industrial template   18 
Less: newly introduced companies during sample period  7 
Less: companies with insufficient data    7 
Less: non listed companies    9 
 
Companies available      123 
 
The companies included in the final balanced panel sample are listed in appendix A. 
 
 
5. RESULTS 
 
5.1 DESCRIPTIVE AND UNIVARIATE RESULTS 
 
First, the companies' SIC-codes were recoded in 1-digit SIC-codes, in order to group the 
companies in several 1-digit SIC-codes. The results are reported in table 4. These results indicate 
that a majority of the sample firms are industrial companies (SIC-codes 1, 2 and 3). Table 5 
provides descriptive information on the variables. 
 
 
Table 4: Sample companies classified on SIC-code. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SIC-category 
 
Description (e.g.) 
 
No. of companies 
 
% of companies 
 
1 
 
Mining, extraction, building, and contractors 
 
10 
 
8.1 
 
2 
 
Food products, textile, furniture, paper, 
chemicals, and petroleum 
 
32 
 
26 
 
3 
 
Metal, industrial machinery, electrical 
equipment, and instruments 
 
33 
 
26.8 
 
4 
 
Transportation, communication, electric, and 
gas 
 
5 
 
4.1 
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5 Wholesale trade and retail 28 22.8 
 
7 
 
Personal services and business services 
 
8 
 
6.5 
 
8 
 
Health, legal, educational, and other services 
 
7 
 
5.7 
 
Table 5: Descriptive information on the variable (data * /1,000.-). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable 
 
Mean 
 
5% trimmed mean 
 
Median 
 
Std. deviation 
 
E 
 
81,196 
 
20,640 
 
8,321 
 
386,805 
 
FTS 
 
36,031 
 
14,595 
 
2,960 
 
125,111 
 
OPCF 
 
351,677 
 
104,830 
 
36,914 
 
1,433,222 
 
OPINC 
 
272,589 
 
77,944 
 
31,009 
 
1,126,286 
 
PTI 
 
257,281 
 
74,304 
 
32,096 
 
1,114,263 
 
TS1 
 
36,031 
 
14,596 
 
2,960 
 
125,111 
 
TS2 
 
8,350 
 
4,506 
 
1,083 
 
97,391 
 
TS3 
 
2,992 
 
3,902 
 
460 
 
64,712 
 
These results reveal that the data are right-skewed and platykurtic. It is interesting to note 
that both the return and tax subsidy measures based on cash flow are larger than their accrual 
counterparts. The mean of the three tax-subsidies variables is positive, indicating that the sample 
companies pay lower taxes than they ought to pay, based on the statutory tax rate.  
To assess the associations between the variables correlations were computed. As the 
distribution of the data was nonnormal, the Spearman rho statistic was computed. Below, the 
correlations and their significance level are reported: 
 
 
Table 6: Spearman correlations and significance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FTS 
 
OPCF 
 
OPINC 
 
PTI 
 
TS1 
 
TS2 
 
TS3 
 
E 
 
0.137 
(0.130) 
 
0.800 
(0.000)** 
 
0.878 
(0.000)** 
 
0.891 
(0.000)** 
 
0.320 
(0.000)** 
 
0.218 
(0.015)* 
 
0.268 
(0.003)** 
 
FTS 
 
 
 
0.232 
(0.010)** 
 
0.272 
(0.002)** 
 
0.241 
(0.007)** 
 
0.180 
(0.047)* 
 
0.338 
(0.000)** 
 
0.257 
(0.004)** 
 
OPCF 
 
 
 
 
 
0.924 
(0.000)** 
 
0.933 
(0.000)** 
 
0.714 
(0.000)** 
 
0.380 
(0.000)** 
 
0.492 
(0.000)** 
 
OPINC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.982 
(0.000)** 
 
0.496 
(0.000)** 
 
0.461 
(0.000)** 
 
0.481 
(0.000)** 
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PTI     0.498 
(0.000)** 
0.380 
(0.000)** 
0.483 
(0.000)** 
 
TS1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.344 
(0.000)** 
 
0.481 
(0.000)** 
 
TS2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.615 
(0.000)** 
* Correlation is significant at 0.05 level; ** Correlation is significant at 0.01 level 
 
Although not all correlations are substantial, most of them are statistically significant. The 
correlation between the cash flow return measure and tax subsidy based on cash flow is greater 
than the corresponding accrual correlations. This might indicate that cash flow data are 'cleaner' 
than accrual data.  
 
5.2 HYPOTHESIS ONE RESULTS 
 
The general linear model results constitute three models, one for each return measure. 
Using the recoded variables (except for the dummy variables) with application of effects-coding 
for the dummy SIC-codes, the following results for the three models were obtained (table 7).  
 
Table 7: General linear model results      
 
Model:  Rcj = " + $1TScj + $2NCCcj + $3FTScj + ,; 
  where c = company, j = year (1991-1996), and R = OPCF, OPINC or PTI 
  
 
 OPCF  OPINC  PTI  
Variable B F-value B F-value B F-value 
TS 
 
-4.729 22.986** 
 
-3.7424 
 
18.388** 
 
-3.7883 
 
8.190** 
 
FTS 
 
0.0702 
 
0.437 
 
0.1208 
 
1.585 
 
0.453 
 
0.654 
 
SIC1 
 
-0.376 
 
-0.448 
 
0.177 
 
0.201 
 
0.389 
 
0.350 
 
SIC2 
 
-0.216 
 
-0.310 
 
1.407 
 
1.847 
 
1.282 
 
1.354 
 
SIC3 
 
-0.942 
 
-1.386 
 
0.172 
 
0.216 
 
0.007 
 
0.008 
 
SIC4 
 
-0.929 
 
-0.954 
 
-0.082 
 
-0.079 
 
-0.770 
 
-0.594 
 
SIC5 
 
-0.138 
 
-0.211 
 
0.281 
 
0.383 
 
0.644 
 
0.697 
 
SIC7 
 
-0.611 
 
-0.561 
 
0.625 
 
0.474 
 
0.489 
 
0.331 
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SIC8 
 
-1.677 
 
-0.618 
 
2.253 
 
0.753 
 
1.870 
 
0.505 
 
Model: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R2 (adj R2) 
 
0.762 
 
(0.703) 
 
0.711 
 
(0.640) 
 
0.556 
 
(0.447) 
 
F 
 
13.043** 
 
 
 
10.050** 
 
 
 
5.115** 
 
 
* significant at 0.05 level; ** significant at 0.01 level 
 
All three models relating to hypothesis 1 are statistically significant at the 0.01 level. This 
statistical significance also holds true for the tax subsidy variable, but not for the foreign tax 
subject variable or the industry dummies. The variance captured by the models is quite high for 
the operating cash flow and operating income models with R-squares of 76.2% and 71.1% 
respectively, but lower for the pre-tax income model with a R-square of 55.6%. Using these 
models hypothesis one can be confirmed. The results indicate that explicit and implicit taxes are 
negatively related. 
The insignificant results for the SIC-dummies might be due to their too general 1-digit 
coding. To test for results on a more detailed industry level, 2-digit SIC coding was applied for 
categories that consisted of five or more companies. Eleven of these categories were present in 
the data set. Three of these categories did show significance in one or more of the models. Results 
for these categories are reported below. 
 
 
Table 8: F-test values and significance levels for selected 2-digit SIC codes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2-digit code 
 
OPCF 
 
 
 
OPINC 
 
 
 
PTI 
 
 
 
 
 
F 
 
Sign 
 
F 
 
Sign 
 
F 
 
Sign 
 
SIC 201 (n = 9) 
 
3.320 
 
0.071 
 
7.317 
 
0.008 
 
3.406 
 
0.068 
 
SIC 27 (n = 5) 
 
4.141 
 
0.044 
 
4.492 
 
0.036 
 
10.418 
 
0.002 
 
SIC 30 (n = 7) 
 
6.160 
 
0.015 
 
1.555 
 
0.215 
 
2.762 
 
0.100 
 
Only the F-values for SIC 27 are statistically significant at the 0.05 level for all models, 
                                                 
1 SIC 20 represents food and kindred products, SIC 27 printing & publishing and SIC 30 rubber and 
miscellaneous plastics products. 
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but not at the 0.01 level. Although there is some support to suggest that certain industries have 
a different association between a company's return and its tax subsidy, the evidence is not 
structurally significant at the 0.01 level.  
 
5.3 HYPOTHESIS TWO RESULTS 
 
Using the results from the general linear model hypothesis two can be tested by the 
following simplified equation: 
 
(II'') ts * Rcj B TScj BEcj = 0 
 
where NCC and FTS have been eliminated since these two variables were not statistically 
significant at the 0.01 significance level in the general linear model. 
Since the variables were not normally distributed, the median test for two populations 
(Kanji, 1993) was performed, using our sample population and an expected population with 
median nil. The results for this test are reported in table 9. 
 
 
Table 9: Median test results. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Model: ts * Rcj B TScj BEcj = 0; where R = OPCF, OPINC, PTI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model 
 
Test value 
 
c.v. (0.10) 
 
c.v. (0.01) 
 
OPCF 
 
63.48 
 
3.84 
 
6.63 
 
OPINC 
 
66.42 
 
3.84 
 
6.63 
 
PTI 
 
63.48 
 
3.84 
 
6.63 
c.v. (0.10); c.v. (0.01): critical value of the O2 distribution with one degree of freedom for 0.10 and 0.01 significance 
levels (two-sided) 
 
The large values of the test statistic enable us to reject the second hypothesis, stating that total 
taxes equal taxes the company ought to pay. In other words, implicit taxes are present, but the 
implicit taxes do not fully offset lower or higher explicit taxes. This may also be caused by 
inadequate control variables used in this design to measure market imperfections. Prior US tax 
accounting research usually did find industry differences relating to explicit tax burden (Effective 
Tax Rates). Our results using Dutch data do not support these findings with regard to implicit 
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taxes. This may be due to differences between the US and Dutch tax system, inadequate SIC 
codes attached to the companies or shortcomings in our research design.  
Furthermore, if Dutch companies' foreign tax rates are, on average, lower or higher than 
the Dutch statutory tax rate (35%), this would affect the association between returns and implicit 
taxes. Our results do not provide support  that foreign tax rates substantially differ from Dutch tax 
rates. This finding, however, is likely to be affected by a number of aspects. Higher foreign tax 
rates in some countries might offset lower foreign tax rates in other countries, thus effectively 
rendering our variable, foreign tax subject status, powerless. There could also be a discrepancy 
between the amount of sales in a particular country and the amount of taxable profit in this 
particular country. In this last instance, our foreign tax subject status variable should be measured 
by another proxy, preferable foreign taxable income relative to total taxable income.  
  
 
21 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
Tax legislators continuously provide firms with tax subsidies. Due to these tax subsidies 
companies pay lower explicit taxes. This would mean companies are not treated in an equitable 
manner. However, arbitrage possibilities will lead to implicit taxes for firms experiencing lower 
explicit taxes. Implicit taxes are the differences between the pre-tax returns of firms experiencing 
full explicit taxes and the pre-tax returns of firms with lower explicit taxes. Thus, empirical 
research in this paper first investigates to what extent implicit taxes are present in the Dutch 
context. Arbitrage possibilities will end when no further gains can be achieved by any of the 
involved parties. On a company level, this would be the case if the companies' total tax burden, 
including both explicit and implicit taxes, would be equal to the amount of taxes the company 
ought to pay when no tax subsidies would be available.  
The second research question investigated in this paper is, whether explicit and implicit 
taxes fully offset each other. This offsetting is likely to be influenced by market imperfections. 
These market imperfections include timing differences between years, lack of competition (i.e. 
due to government regulation), and different tax rates between national tax systems. To address 
these market imperfections,  a balanced panel sample of listed companies for six years is used, as 
well as proxies to measure the lack of competition and international differences in tax rates. Due 
to limited availability of data our proxies may not fully capture the expected market 
imperfections. 
Our results confirm (1) the existence of implicit taxes for Dutch listed companies. Our 
model is however, not able to attribute market imperfections to industry differences and level of 
foreign activities. This may also provide an explanation for (2) our finding that taxes appear to be 
inequitable to some extent, as total taxes are not equal across companies.  
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APPENDIX A 
  
AALBERTS INDUSTRIES N.V.  
AKZO NOBEL N.V.  
ALANHERI NV  
APOTHEKERS COOPERATIE OPG U.A.  
ASM INTERNATIONAL N.V.  
ATAG HOLDING N.V.  
ATHLON GROEP NV  
AXXICON GROUP NV  
BALLAST NEDAM NV  
BATENBURG BEHEER N.V.  
BLYDENSTEIN-WILLINK N.V.  
BROCACEF HOLDING NV  
BURGMAN HEYBROEK NV  
CAP GEMINI NV  
CINDU INTERNATIONAL N.V.  
CONTENT BEHEER NV  
CROWN VAN GELDER PAPIERFABRIEKEN N.V.  
CSM N.V.  
DE BOER WINKELBEDRIJVEN N.V.  
DELFT INSTRUMENTS NV  
DICO INTERNATIONAL NV  
DRAKA HOLDING NV  
DSM N.V.  
ERIKS HOLDING N.V.  
EUROPEAN MARKETING  
INFORMATION SERVICES  
FLEXOVIT INTERNATIONAL N.V.  
FUGRO NV  
GAMMA HOLDING NV  
GELDERSE PAPIERGROEP NV  
GETRONICS N.V.  
GEVEKE N.V.  
GOUDA VUURVAST HOLDING NV  
GRAND HOTEL KRASNAPOLSKY NV  
GRONTMIJ NV  
HAGEMEYER N.V.  
HEIDEMIJ NV  
HEIJMANS NV  
HEINEKEN N.V.  
HELVOET HOLDING NV  
HES BEHEER N.V.  
HIM FURNESS NV  
HOLLAND COLOURS NV  
HOLLANDSCHE BETON GROEP NV  
HUNTER DOUGLAS N.V.  
IHC CALAND N.V.  
INTERNATIO-MUELLER N.V.  
KLENE HOLDING NV  
KON NEDERLANDSCHE PETROLEUM 
AATSCHAPPIJ M 
KONINKLIJKE AHOLD NV  
KONINKLIJKE AHREND NV  
KONINKLIJKE BAM GROEP N.V.  
KONINKLIJKE BOLSWESSANEN N.V.  
KONINKLIJKE BOSKALIS WESTMINSTER N.V.  
KONINKLIJKE ECONOSTO N.V.  
KONINKLIJKE FRANS MAAS GROEP N.V.  
KONINKLIJKE GIST-BROCADES N.V.  
KONINKLIJKE GROLSCH NV  
KONINKLIJKE HOOGOVENS NV  
KONINKLIJKE LANDRE & GLINDERMAN N.V.  
KONINKLIJKE NEDLLOYD N.V.  
KONINKLIJKE NEDSCHROEF HOLDING NV  
KONINKLIJKE PAKHOED N.V.  
KONINKLIJKE PTT NEDERLAND NV  
KONINKLIJKE TEN CATE N.V.  
KONINKLIJKE UBBINK N.V.  
KONINKLIJKE VAN OMMEREN N.V.  
KONINKLIJKE VOLKER WESSELS STEVIN NV  
KOPPELPOORT HOLDING N.V.  
KUEHNE & HEITZ NV  
LCI COMPUTER GROUP NV  
MACINTOSH RETAIL GROUP NV  
MULDER BOSKOOP NV  
MULTIHOUSE N.V.  
N.V. HOEK'S MACHINE- EN ZUURSTOFFABRIEK  
N.V. KONINKLIJKE PORCELEYNE FLES  
N.V. KONINKLIJKE SPHINX GUSTAVSBERG  
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N.V. VERENIGDE BEDRIJVEN NUTRICIA  
NAEFF NV  
NAGRON NATIONAAL GRONDBEZIT N.V.  
NBM-AMSTELLAND N.V.  
NEDCON GROEP NV  
NEWAYS ELECTRONICS NTERNATIONAL NV  
NKF HOLDING N.V.  
NORIT N.V.  
NV HOLDINGMAATSCHAPPIJ DE TELEGRAAF  
NV KONINKLIJKE BIJENKORF BEHEER KBB  
NV KONINKLIJKE KNP BT  
NV NEDERLANDSCHE APPARATENFABRIEK 
EDAP N 
NV VERENIGD BEZIT VNU  
ORDINA BEHEER NV  
OTRA N.V.  
P & C GROEP NV  
PHILIPS ELECTRONICS N.V.  
POLYGRAM N.V.  
POLYNORM N.V.  
RANDSTAD HOLDING N.V.  
REESINK N.V.  
ROOD TESTHOUSE INTERNATIONAL NV  
ROTO SMEETS DE BOER NV  
ROYAL PACKAGING INDUSTRIES VAN LEER B.V.  
RUBBER CULTUUR MAATSCHAPPIJ AMSTERDAM 
V N 
SAMAS-GROEP N.V.  
SCHUITEMA N.V.  
SCHUTTERSVELD  N.V.  
SIMAC TECHNIEK NV  
SLIGRO BEHEER NV  
SMIT INTERNATIONALE N.V.  
SMIT TRANSFORMATOREN NV  
STORK NV  
TEXTIELGROEP TWENTHE NV  
TULIP COMPUTERS N.V.  
UNILEVER N.V.  
UNIQUE INTERNATIONAL NV  
VAN DER GIESSEN-DE NOORD NV  
VAN DORP DESPEC GROEP N.V.  
VAN MELLE NV  
VENDEX INTERNATIONAL N.V.  
VILENZO INTERNATIONAL NV  
VREDESTEIN N.V.  
WEGENER N.V.  
WELNA N.V.  
WEWELER N.V.  
WOLTERS KLUWER N.V. 
 
